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Background: Innovative financing strategies such as those that integrate supply and demand elements like the
output-based approach (OBA) have been implemented to reduce financial barriers to maternal health services. The
Kenyan government with support from the German Development Bank (KfW) implemented an OBA voucher
program to subsidize priority reproductive health services. Little evidence exists on the experience of implementing
such programs in different settings. We describe the implementation process of the Kenyan OBA program and
draw implications for scale up.
Methods: Policy analysis using document review and qualitative data from 10 in-depth interviews with facility in-
charges and 18 with service providers from the contracted facilities, local administration, health and field managers
in Kitui, Kiambu and Kisumu districts as well as Korogocho and Viwandani slums in Nairobi.
Results: The OBA implementation process was designed in phases providing an opportunity for learning and
adapting the lessons to local settings; the design consisted of five components: a defined benefit package,
contracting and quality assurance; marketing and distribution of vouchers and claims processing and
reimbursement. Key implementation challenges included limited feedback to providers on the outcomes of quality
assurance and accreditation and budgetary constraints that limited effective marketing leading to inadequate
information to clients on the benefit package. Claims processing and reimbursement was sophisticated but
required adherence to time consuming procedures and in some cases private providers complained of low
reimbursement rates for services provided.
Conclusions: OBA voucher schemes can be implemented successfully in similar settings. For effective scale up,
strong partnership will be required between the public and private entities. The government’s role is key and
should include provision of adequate funding, stewardship and looking for opportunities to utilize existing
platforms to scale up such strategies.
Keywords: Output-based approach, Reproductive health, Vouchers, Maternal health, Safe motherhood,
Family planning, Policy analysisBackground
The direct costs of maternal health care are prohibitive
to many women in low income countries. Fear of high
costs and potential catastrophic expenditure that push a
household further into poverty causes many women and
their families to risk giving birth at home or delay seeking
care. In these settings between one and five percent of total
annual household expenditure is spent on maternal health
care, rising to between five and 34 percent in case of* Correspondence: tabuya@popcouncil.org
Population Council Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orobstetric complications [1]. Innovative approaches have
been implemented to reduce the financial barriers to ma-
ternal health services in low income countries [2]. These
approaches include demand-side consumer-led initiatives
like cash transfers and tax rebates as well as supply-side
provider-led initiatives like referral vouchers and strategies
that integrate supply and demand elements like the
output-based approach (OBA) [3].
In principle, OBA improves efficiency in service deliv-
ery through competition, targets essential health services
to specific population groups such as low incomeLtd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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and acts as a means to change behavior [4,5]. OBA aims
to cushion households from the catastrophic household
expenditure associated with relatively high-cost inter-
ventions such as emergency obstetric care. The key ele-
ments include redeemable vouchers, health funds or
insurance schemes that are intended to subsidize the tar-
get health services so that the out-of-pocket cost of
medical care at the point of delivery becomes lower than
the market price [5]. Demand side approaches seek to
widen financial access and contribute to meeting Millen-
nium Development Goal (MDG-5) which calls for sig-
nificant reductions in maternal mortality [6].
To address the challenges of accessing reproductive
health (RH) services, the Kenyan government with sup-
port from the German Development Bank (KfW) devel-
oped an OBA voucher program to subsidize selected RH
services. Although a previous description has been docu-
mented [7], it focused on the initial phase of the pro-
gram (2006–2008) and did not provide rigorous analysis
of the implementation experiences. This paper explores
how to work with the private and public sector using a
voucher model, policy issues of targeting/benefiting
populations and administrative complexities of imple-
menting such a program [8]. We review the implemen-
tation experiences of the OBA program in Kenya with
an aim of identifying lessons that can be used to provide
policy directions in the implementation of similar pro-
grams in different settings and to scale. To do this we
trace the implementation process of the Kenyan OBA
program since inception (2006–2010) using policy ana-
lysis tools.
Methods
There is an increasing recognition of the role of policy
analysis in public health evaluation [9]. In addition,
health system interventions have unpredictable paths of
implementation and that interpretative, time-dependent
decisions by different actors underpin the subsequent
implementation process. We utilize the policy analysis
framework, which emphasizes the need to take account
of who (actors) and how (process) decisions are made,
what (content) decisions are made and under what con-
ditions (context) [10]. In addition, we examine the role
of actors and their influence as a central theme through
a stakeholder analysis [11,12] to draw out programmatic
lessons for scale up.
This paper draws from two sets of data. First, a docu-
ment review was conducted of available project and
evaluation reports, publications and other relevant docu-
ments on the voucher project. From this we generated
evidence on the dynamics of implementation, activities
conducted and the decisions made over time. Docu-
mentary materials included seven design reports andcontractual documents, five annual and midterm review
reports, eight advisory and 20 steering committee min-
utes including four back-stopping mission reports.
The second set of data was qualitative interviews col-
lected as part of the evaluation activities of the OBA
programme in Kenya [13]. The overall aim of the quali-
tative component was to gain a deeper understanding of
the perceptions of the actors on the programme. This
paper draws from in-depth interviews (IDIs) conducted
across five program sites: Kitui, Kiambu and Kisumu
districts as well as Korogocho and Viwandani slums in
Nairobi. Ten IDIs were conducted with health facility
in-charges and 18 with service providers from the
contracted facilities, District Medical Officers, Public
Health Officers, local leaders and field managers.
In each site, a team of trained researchers conducted
interviews with a standardized guide. Discussions with
contracted providers, facility in-charges and field man-
agers focused on their perceptions of programme
design including accreditation, reimbursements, referral
mechanisms, voucher distribution and perceived barriers
to programme implementation. Interviews with local lea-
ders examined access to reproductive health services and
general community perceptions about the services,
awareness of the programme, perceived impact and bar-
riers to use of the vouchers at the community level.
Where consent was given qualitative interviews were
recorded translated into English, transcribed and typed
into Microsoft Word software. Debriefing sessions were
held by the research team after each interview to provide
an overview of issues raised. Informal analysis was
conducted and summaries of the collected data made
after each session for clarification or follow up. The data
were stored and managed using QSR Nvivo8 Software
(© QSR international Pty 2007, Australia).
Analysis of qualitative data entailed categorisation of
issues based on inductive and deductive approaches by
which a priori themes were used as a starting point.
Later the thematic framework was improved as more
data were examined [14]. Regular consultations were
held with other members of the research team to en-
hance reflexivity. The analysis was also enriched by use-
ful insights from members of the research team
especially CW who was involved in the inception phase
of the pilot program. Their views were useful in the in-
terpretation on the role of actors and their influence on
the implementation experiences.
Themes generated were further compared against ana-
lysis charts, which were developed based on the policy
analysis framework [10]. Analysis charts were compared
within and across sites to look for similarities and differ-
ences of key issues around implementation processes.
Final analysis was organised around a description of the
implementation process, role of actors, and power
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within and across sites, with a view to identify complex
interactions between key explanatory factors that ac-
count for the implementation practices at both national
and district levels. We further drew from a complemen-
tary body of work on how to investigate power [15] to
generate evidence on the importance of power dynamics
on implementation of programs.
Ethical approvals were granted from Population Coun-
cil Institutional Review Board and the Kenya Medical
Research Institute (KEMRI) Ethics and Research Com-
mittee. Written informed consent were obtained from
all the interviewees. To protect the identity of partici-
pants at the point of data collection and reporting is an
important ethical procedure. However, a dilemma recog-
nised in this study is lack of complete anonymity of data
especially during reporting given the small number of
actors being interviewed. Attempts were made to min-
imise these problems and strike a balance between the
value of providing information on implementation
experiences and anonymising participants. Interviewees
were also given the options of not using voice recorders
during interviews and to omit their quotes in reports
and papers. Another measure used to maintain anonym-
ity in reporting was the use of broad actor groups to in-
dicate the perspective of the information without linking
to a particular actor. This was important as certain in-
formation was considered sensitive but necessary to il-
lustrate challenges of implementation.
Results
Program inception
The overarching goal of the OBA program is to improve
access to RH services, decrease maternal and child
deaths and increase acceptance of the long term family
planning (FP) services. Document review suggested that
this was to be achieved through provision of safe mother-
hood (SM), FP and gender-based violence recovery ser-
vices (GBVRS) vouchers. The SM and FP vouchers
targeted poor women while the GBVRS was to cater for
all survivors regardless of socio-economic status. It was
envisaged that the OBA would provide crucial experi-
ences in targeting, accreditation, claims, reimbursement
and quality for the then proposed National Social Health
Insurance Fund. The program was designed in 2006 in
view of Kenya’s poor maternal mortality indicators.
The planning process took several years from concep-
tion to program launch. Initial consultations were done
late 2003 culminating in the creation of a technical sup-
port mission in early 2004 bringing together partners
from government, donors, non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) and faith-based organizations (FBOs) in a
workshop where the voucher concept was introduced
and discussed [16]. The results of the 2004 technicalmission were presented in a feasibility report to the
donors and the executing agency, the then National Co-
ordinating Agency for Population and Development
(NCAPD) renamed as the National Council for Popula-
tion and Development in 2012. This included recom-
mendations for the design, cost, and organizational
structure of the program, investments in information sys-
tems, financial systems, capacity development and mar-
keting strategies [17]. Following this, in early 2005, an
agreement was reached between the governments of
Kenya and Germany through the German Development
Bank to fund RH services in Kenya through a voucher
program with an estimated budget of 6.5 million Euros.
These funds supported a pilot implementation (“Phase
1”) carried out over three years (2006–2008).
Organizational arrangements and role of actors
The voucher program was established under the Minis-
try of Planning through NCAPD, mandated to oversee
the implementation (Figure 1). NCAPD chaired essential
organs of implementation and was instrumental in mak-
ing decisions on design and management including con-
tracting the voucher management agency. NCAPD being
the executing agency was a powerful actor drawing their
influence from their mandate (Table 1). The executive
team was chaired by an enthusiastic team leader who
was viewed as the champion of the OBA concept in
Kenya and was responsible for popularising it within
government circles. Qualitative interviews showed that
this provided an opportunity for effective leadership and
an avenue for donors and other government agencies to
support the concept leading to effective implementation
in the initial phases. Table 2 summarizes the role of
actors involved and their influence during the imple-
mentation period.
The operation of the program was realized through
two committees representing distinct interest groups.
The committees carried out their activities within the
NCAPD mandate. The first committee was the advisory
board with an oversight role and its members drawn
from NGOs, Ministry of Health (MoH), the German So-
ciety for International Cooperation (then GTZ, now
GIZ), FBOs, and the private doctors’ association. The
board held regular meetings to receive quarterly reports
from the steering committee and make decisions on pro-
gram functioning. It was chaired by the executive team
of NCAPD and was highly influential in the planning,
design, and implementation process at all levels. The
second committee was the OBA Steering Committee
(OSC) comprising representatives from NCAPD, MoH
Department of Reproductive Health (DRH), KfW and
the technical backstopping team. They met quarterly
and defined operational procedures and organized meet-
ing schedules. Although the committee reported to the
Disposition 
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NCPAD 
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Figure 1 Organizational arrangement of the project.
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them with ability to give direction on the program and
make recommendations to the advisory committee on
changes to be made.
The overall implementation process was managed by
the voucher management agency (VMA)—a consortium
of PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) and Population Coun-
cil selected through a competitive selection process in
October 2005. The Population Council’s role was limited
and had little input in the project beyond the first year.
Although Population Council contributed to the design
phase, its role in the program can be viewed as a missed
opportunity as their potential (given its expertise in re-
productive health) was not utilized maximally leading to
the council’s middle support for the program (Table 1).
The VMA reported directly to NCAPD through the
Steering Committee. It was involved in the adaptation of
the program to local settings. Although the VMA wascriticized for not having public health expertise being a fi-
nancial audit firm, their strength lay in its own internal
management system that facilitated the implementation
process including an internal monitoring and evaluation
department, and claims processing section. They main-
tained direct contractual arrangements with the providers.
The VMA can be viewed to have less “power” in relation
to the NCAPD but in essence it had extensive influence
amongst service providers, distributors and clients as indi-
cated in Table 1. The VMA played a significant role during
the initial phases of the program helping to generate evi-
dence for scale up. The VMA, however, being the main im-
plementer was not represented in the steering committee
giving them little opportunity to directly discuss imple-
mentation issues and get resolutions to program-related
problems in a timely manner.
Other actors include the MoH/DRH, which was less
influential in the initial phase although the RH service
Table 1 Force field map illustrating level of power and influence by actors involved
Level of
power
Proponents
Non mobilised
Opponents
High support Middle Low Low Middle High opposition
High NCAPD
Advisory board
Steering
Committee
Medium Price water house
Coopers(PwC) -
VMA
MoH-DRH
NHIF
IGES
Voucher distributors
Service Providers
Nairobi
Women’s
hospital
Low Marie Stopes Microd
Consult
Kalzmat
Security
Population
Council
Lowe
Scanad
Kenya
Medical
educational
Trust
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missed opportunities as they did not provide the needed
RH technical expertise leading to their middle position
they occupied in terms of supporting the program
(Table 1). The VMA also contracted Lowe Scanad, a
local marketing firm to design a marketing strategy to
create demand. In addition, a marketing consultant was
hired for independent evaluation of the effectiveness of
the voucher marketing and distribution functions. How-
ever, these actors contributed minimally over the pro-
gram period resulting in low influence towards program
implementation and are represented as actors with low
support or were not well mobilized for effective imple-
mentation in Table 1.
The National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) was
given a contract to accredit voucher service providers
(VSPs). This was made for technical as well as stra-
tegic reasons to gather political support from the gov-
ernment. It was selected to ensure continuity with
the program in its capacity as the agency that con-
ducts Standards and Quality Assurance of health ser-
vice providers in the country. NHIF’s interests were
in building more evidence on the potential for ex-
panding universal access for medical insurance cover-
age. However, initial progress of the quality assurance
process was not comprehensive enough; in particular,
a lack of periodic system of monitoring quality led to
an inability to ensure quality structures were put in
place, which may have implied that NHIF lacked the
resources and will to conduct quality assurance
assessments.Analyzing the content and design of the program
Document review indicated that when the program was
initiated it offered limited number of services but add-
itional services were included once the concept of OBA
was well understood amongst key actors. For example,
the initial benefit package did not include antenatal care
(ANC) services since its uptake was generally high but it
was introduced later after extensive deliberations. The
SM voucher thus covered ANC care, labor and delivery,
caesarean section, postnatal care up to six weeks, as well
as complications of pregnancy and childbirth at a subsi-
dized price of $ 2.5a to poor women (Table 3). Providers
were reimbursed $ 44 for SM vouchers redeemed and an
average of $ 225 for caesarian section deliveries. The FP
voucher covered: intra uterine contraceptive devices
(IUCD), implants, and surgical contraception (tubal
ligation and vasectomy) at a cost of $ 1.25 with a reim-
bursement to providers of about $ 12 for non surgical
procedures and $34 for surgical procedures. The GBVRS
voucher was initially supposed to operate along the same
lines as SM and FP, with specified limits for counseling
and medical treatment by specific accredited service pro-
viders. However, due to the unpredictability of the event
and the stigma it carries it was decided that the vouchers
would only be available at the health facilities for free
and be reimbursed at full cost of service.
Contracting and quality assurance
Accreditation process was characterized by the develop-
ment of criteria that was developed by Population Council
and DRH. The criteria for accrediting FP and SM services
Table 2 Actors’ interests, position and influences on implementation process
Category of Actors Roles in the program Interest Level of
power
Position
The Project Executing
Agency-NCAPD
The MoH was engaged in
conceiving and planning the
introduction NSHIF. For this
reason, the MoH’s capacities to
introduce new concepts and
approaches into the service delivery
system were stretched to the limit.
Ministry of Planning and National
Development offered to step in as
the temporary host with the
Programme Executing Agency
being the NCAPD
High High Supportive
Advisory board Provided support and advice on the
medical, administrative, economic,
and ethical matters. Promoted and
maintained communication with the
steering committee. Endorsed the
VMA’s quarterly progress report
and plans. Oversaw the OBA
program implementation and link
program to policy and political stream
High High Supportive
Steering committee Reviewed and approved draft
contracts for distributors and
providers, including the fee
schedule; all planed activities,
quarterly budgets and operational
plans, evaluation and audit reports.
Monitoring and coordination of the
program on behalf of GOK;
provided backstopping where
necessary and made decisions
regarding the implementation,
adaptation and improvement of the program
High High Supportive
MoH-DRH Overall policy guidance with less
involvement in the implementation
High Medium Supportive
Pricewaterhousecoopers
Water House (PwC) VMA
Contracted to train VSP; developed
and implemented a marketing and
distribution strategy for the vouchers,
Collection and processing of claims;
paid for the services according to the
terms of the contracts
High Medium Supportive
NHIF Selected as the government agency
mandated to conduct quality
assurance. Accreditation and
quality assurance
High Medium Middle support
Microd Consult Selected after tendering to support
NCPAD to develop a monitoring and
evaluation framework but did not to play
an active role
Low Low Middle support
Lowe Scanad Marketing the program in various project sites Low Low Middle support
International actors
Marketing Consultant Provided independent evaluation of the
effectiveness of the marketing and
distribution functions
Medium Medium Middle support
KfW Provided funding and were instrumental in
designing the concept
High High Supportive
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Table 2 Actors’ interests, position and influences on implementation process (Continued)
Institut für Gesundheits- und
Sozialforschung (IGES)
Selected as consultants to the programme
during its starting phase and to periodically provide
professional inputs on the concept,
overall programme management,
medical aspects associated with the
different services covered by the vouchers,
marketing and reimbursement systems.
Mediating different stakeholders.
Contracted to offer back stopping
services since it was the only one with
knowledge on the voucher program
High Medium Supportive
Local actors
Voucher distributors Marketing of the vouchers, interviewing
clients to ensure target beneficiaries
obtain the voucher
High Medium Supportive
Service providers Providing services to voucher clients,
prepare the requisite documentation on services
provided for claims processing and report to
VMA any irregularities noted on vouchers
presented by clients
High Medium Supportive
Nairobi Women’s Hospital Identified based on being the only facility
that provided gender-based violence recovery services
High Medium Supportive
Kalzmat Security Print Ltd Printing vouchers Middle Low Immobilised
Marie Stopes Developed and provision of a participatory
poverty grading tool that was used to identify
eligible clients for the voucher system
High Low Supportive
Kenya Medical and Educational Trust Involved in initial design phases
but not in implementation
Low Low Immobilised
Population Council Involved in development of the accreditation
criteria and standards for voucher package and the
quality assurance manual
High Low Supportive
African Population and Health Research Center Involved in initial design phases but not in implementation Low Low Immobilized
Community level actors
Beneficiaries Responsible for seeking the vouchers and using them to
access services at the accredited VSP’s.
Required to provide accurate and true information
to the voucher distributor which is used to
determine their eligibility
High Low Supportive
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were no criteria that could be drawn for GBVRS; these
were developed based on experience and local circum-
stances. NHIF was involved in selecting the VSPs and ac-
credit them in consultation with the Technical Committee
on Accreditation and Quality Assurance.
Data from the qualitative interviews show that ac-
creditation of health facilities was adapted to local set-
tings. During phase two some facilities were contracted
even though they did not meet minimum standards with
the aim of supporting competition and patient choice,
and with the understanding that their service quality
would improve over time: “I think it’s the situation of the
facility since it’s too interior and we also needed support
since we are getting mothers delivering mostly with the
Traditional Birth Attendants because they cannot afford
delivering in the hospitals. And we also needed to
improve the services in the facility” (Clinical Officer-Dispensary). The aim was to nurture capacity and ex-
perience among providers. This was hoped that it would
yield benefits beyond the scope of the voucher program.
However, this resulted in limited services as some of the
providers were unable to offer the full benefit package.
NHIF accredited a total of 54 VSPs to offer RH ser-
vices during phase one. However, it was evident that
there were differences between the VMA and NHIF
regarding the process and timing of quality assurance
mechanisms. While the VMA perceived that it is was
sufficient to examine service quality once a year, NHIF
was convinced that the increasing number of voucher
clients required frequent monitoring and training of
hospital staff. Although quality assurance inspection
by the NHIF was planned to be done every six
months, this was not adequately implemented. In Au-
gust 2008, the technical committee was reconstituted
under the leadership of the Head of Division of
Table 3 Key design features
Key features Characteristics
1. Benefit package
Safe motherhood (SM)
Management of
labour and
complications
✓ Delivery- vacuum extraction and caesarean care
✓ Emergency obstetric care; manage all stages of labour
✓ Refer for emergency obstetric care services
✓ Management of postpartum hemorrhage, eclampsia but not abortion
related issues
✓ Management of retained placenta, prolonged labour/obstructed,
ruptured uterus.
✓ Four ANC visits
Post natal care ✓ Within six hours of delivery examination of clients for danger signs
✓ Referral for postpartum hemorrhage, third degree tear
✓ Newborn care and referral for sick new born
✓ Post operative care for Caesarean section
✓ Review mother and counsel on infant feeding practices
✓ Contraception and PMTCT services
Long term Family
planning methods
✓ Long-term contraception methods but at present underutilized-
implants, IUCD, male and female voluntary surgical contraception
Gender based
violence
✓ Medical examination and treatment and management of injuries
✓ Hospitalization and accommodation
✓ Laboratory testing and X-rays including (HIV/AIDS, High Vaginal Swab,
Hepatitis, Pregnancy, Syphilis, Urinalysis, Haemogram, Liver Function
✓ Access to pregnancy prevention medication & antiretroviral drugs
✓ Professional counselling
2. Quality Assurance
Infrastructure and
basic services
✓ Facilities with basic equipment and infrastructure and staff according to the level of care
✓ Provision of basic emergency and comprehensive obstetric care
Monitoring quality ✓ Documentation of treatment given including filling in the partograph, patient file notes and register
✓ Documentation to facilitate reimbursements and claims
✓ Analysis of claims data regularly every three months
3. Selection of facilities and accreditation process
Selection of
providers
✓ Mapping of facilities in selected districts based on level of care and
service given (basic and comprehensive obstetric care) and licensed service providers
✓ Selection made by an assessor using set criteria
Contracting
providers and
distributors
✓ Contractual agreements with selected VSPs and distributors
4. Marketing and distribution
Distribution process ✓ Two mechanisms used; direct approach distribution where vouchers are sold to clients in their homes;
use of specific locations- where clients will go to specific points to access the vouchers such as
preferred fixed selling points such as pharmacies.
Marketing strategy ✓ Designed to use local media, radio shows, vans buses, fliers and posters and marketed as VOCHA brand
5. Claims and reimbursement process
Claims processing ✓ Time line pegged at a month from presenting claim with proper documentation
Reimbursement ✓ Reimbursement fee set based on a market analysis of what different facilities charged and negotiated
6. Management system ✓ System of managing program with clearly defined roles
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http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/12/540Family Health to undertake a review on the quality
assurance status on the accredited VSPs. It was also
evident from technical committee findings that the ac-
creditation process was not well synchronized and
lacked feedback mechanism to the providers. Overall
the review of quality assurance procedures reveal that
basic RH policies, guidelines and standards were gen-
erally not well implemented while the VSPs had very
little or no access to refresher trainings and RH skills
update from MoH.
Marketing and distribution of vouchers
The Kenya voucher program was designed to utilise the
existing local administrative structures, community and
opinion leaders to popularise it. This was envisaged to
play a vital role in creating awareness among the target
community. However, community level discussions
showed that the process was not effectively implemen-
ted. There was evidence that in some sites, the adminis-
trative offices provided venues for fixed distribution
points for voucher sales. The distribution process uti-
lised a poverty grading tool for both SM and FP services
except the gender violence recovery services, which were
made available in health facilities for all who needed it.
The marketing strategy was generally not intense during
the initial implementation period despite contracting a
marketing firm. Qualitative interviews show promotional
activities were targeted in specific locations and the in-
formation was limited to less remote settings leading to
poor uptake of vouchers. Initial plans were to use mul-
tiple marketing campaign strategies such as local radio
advertisement, road shows, and educational strategies.
Use of radio broadcast turned out to work well inCreate Awar
of OBA-R
Project
Comply 
claim r
Identify potential 
voucher distributors 
Issue distributor 
application forms 
Analyze completed 
application forms 
Contract and train 
successful applicants 
Monitor and evaluate Voucher 
utilization 
Figure 2 Voucher distribution process.Kisumu, but none was available in the Nairobi slum
area. In Kiambu, the response to radio spots was
received with an overwhelming majority and many
people from as far as Nairobi were attracted to partici-
pate without necessarily being eligible. This high de-
mand led to a discontinuation of the radio spots. On the
other hand, it was noted that the role of the marketing
agency was potentially limited by budgetary constraints,
time and complex marketing strategies required. The
role of the agency was thus reduced to undertaking a
one-off activity with limited interactions across sites
resulting in their low influence suggesting lost opportun-
ity to maximise their potential.
Voucher distribution was based on two approaches.
One was a fixed point distribution linked to the commis-
sioned agents who received 25% commission per vou-
cher. This approach was not well executed leading to
malpractices such as disregarding adherence to the pov-
erty grading tool. In addition in some instances distribu-
tors attempted to sell vouchers to clients who were in
extreme need such as in hospitals to women in early
labour or in other instances selling to those who did not
come from the target community or avoiding sparsely
populated rural areas. Following this experience a deci-
sion was reached to hire full-time trained distributors on
a monthly stipend. Utilising this approach had the unin-
tended benefit of accommodating some women who
could not afford to pay up front for vouchers as distribu-
tors were more likely to let women to pay in install-
ments. In general though, there was a perception that
there was need to further improve the distribution
process. Figure 2 shows the arrangement behind the vou-
cher distribution process.eness 
H 
Accredit selected 
VSPs
with Voucher 
equirements
Monitor and evaluate service 
provision and claim settlement 
Train Selected VSPs 
Select VSPs for 
contracting
Provide contracted 
services
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The claims process was one aspect that was elaborate
and required adherence to procedure. Both interviews
and documentary review showed that once clients visited
an accredited facility with a voucher for services under
the benefits package, the VSPs provided the service and
then filed the necessary documentation for reimburse-
ment. These documents include: the original voucher,
duly completed service claim form, discharge summary
or medical report, a copy of the patient’s or guardian’s
identification card, and the original invoice and state-
ment of account on the invoices being submitted to
VMA. Submitted claims were first verified and then
sent through the approval process. As soon as pay-
ments were ready they were wired into the VSP’s bank
accounts and an advice sent to the VSP, advising on
the particular payments effected and invoices included
in the payment.
The program design provided for a reimbursement
procedure that could process claims within 30 days
through a computer system. However, this was not the
case in practice as the process was perceived to be slow
and cumbersome and did not account to actual pay-
ments made..: “I think the process of reimbursement
takes too long. There’s a time you claim and the time
you are receiving this money it takes quite a while and
you see when we send these claims; when they are reim-
bursing us they should also send a copy of what they
have paid and what they have not paid explaining why
what was not paid . ..... .... The last time I called there I
was told there is a problem with the claim processing
system; we should wait” (Provider). Although sometimes
the delay was occasioned by challenges of the claims
system within the VMA, some facilities also violated
the guidelines stipulated by attending to clients for con-
ditions not included in the benefit package resulting in
a claim rejection. In other cases claims were rejected
because claim forms were signed by hospital staff on
behalf of the clients, providers tampered with the vou-
cher details or submitted incomplete, inconsistent or
delayed documentation.
The VMA set ceilings for the reimbursement of vari-
ous services based on an earlier study. The actual reim-
bursement rates were negotiated with each service
provider based on the respective cost situation. Add-
itional expenses from medical complications were cov-
ered by the VMA as long as they were deemed valid and
documented well. In spite of this there were complaints
around the ceiling set as providers in some private facil-
ities suggested the amount was too little “ ........I also feel
the amount of money they are giving us is not enough.
For example if we have ANC; if our clients come here,
the cash patients or non-OBA patient; they are usually 3
or 4 visits. For 3 visits, that is KES 900 and also the firstvisit when you come, we charge KES 400. Then there is
the ANC profile done during the first ANC visit; our pro-
file costs KES 1000. When you add this all up it is giving
you around KES 2300 for a cash patient of which the
OBA are giving us only KES 1000. When it comes to nor-
mal delivery, our normal delivery ranges from five to
around eight or ten thousand but the OBA they are giv-
ing us four thousand. If it’s above four thousand, that is
a complication. Come to Caesarean, our Caesarean
ranges from about twenty-one to around thirty
[thousand]. They are only giving us twenty thousand
(Private provider).
In some places, this resulted to voucher clients getting
less attention than non-voucher clients who can pay
higher prices. Moreover some private establishments
were reluctant to participate although they were better
located to serve target clients. Others who were accre-
dited pulled out as a result of being overwhelmed by the
demand created by voucher clients. Although, some pro-
viders felt obliged to treat all clients equally and not to
discriminate against voucher clients, taking into account
their capacity constraints, they could only do so by limit-
ing access for voucher clients. This contradicted a major
principle of the voucher systems that is client’s free
choice among all accredited service providers.
Apart from processing claims and accessing the funds,
providers working in public facilities reported challenges
in utilizing the reimbursements from voucher clients.
The bureaucratic barriers in the public health system
meant that most public health facilities could not benefit
from the proceeds of voucher clients. To address this
there were long deliberations and consultations with the
MoH and it was agreed that money generated from the
OBA would be used by the public service providers to
improve care (such as purchase of supplies, laboratory
consumables, improve sanitary conditions) but not to
hire additional staff on a permanent basis. Hiring staff
on a temporarily basis was accepted. The general view
among providers was that funds generated from voucher
service delivery were to be exclusively used for improve-
ment of quality service in reproductive health services;
however, bureaucratic requirements limited its use; “I
am telling you now this money we are not able to use it
as the OBA money. It is consolidated as the hospital
money so trying to push it back to the facility like now
the maternity it is a struggle. So we tried from the Minis-
try whether it can be banked as the OBA money and
they refused. We cannot do that. It is against government
policy. So if all this money was to be banked separately
then we could be able to access the money 100% but now
we are not able. Because now once the committee sits
down to budget whatever we have collected it is included.
And then the facility receives it as what they have bud-
geted for that facility,. . . although matron tries to insist
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ment” (Provider).
Overall, providers experienced challenges such as lack
of awareness among clients and providers in the reim-
bursable services, delays in payment, lack of information
on those claims that were rejected and inadequate com-
munication on the procedures as one provider was
quoted: “feedback is not good at all , .... Like for example
I told you we had a meeting in May and it’s just last
month we received one payment. We don’t know for
which batch the payment is because there was no advice
slip that was sent. From then we have not received any
other and yet we are still seeing these patients. They
have not communicated back. We send a letter to them,
nothing was said. We send another letter and it has not
been replied” (Provider).
Implementation process
The implementation process was designed in phases as
shown in Figure 3. The phased implementation provided
an opportunity for learning and adapting the program to
local settings and making necessary changes. One im-
portant contextual event in Kenya that helped to drive
the voucher agenda forward was the fact that parliament
was considering adopting legislation to create a National
Social Health Insurance Fund. The voucher concept
was viewed by some Kenyan policymakers as a useful
model to prepare for the envisaged national social health
insurance fund.
Phase one was implemented between October 2005
and October 2008. The first nine months were charac-
terized by planning and setting up of the program. The
project was launched officially in the first pilot district inPlanning and 
initial consultation  Technical mission  Program launch  Setting up of 
technical 
committee  
Phase one
Bil
for 
Development phase 
Signing of formal 
agreement 
Program Set up  
Baseline study  
Program Design  
Selection of 
VMA 
Planning and preparatory phase 
2003 2004 2005 2006    200
Figure 3 Time line of the implementation process.Kisumu in mid 2006 after a four month delay of project
funds. This also delayed contracts for marketing, VSP
accreditation and quality assurance. The project began
with eight accredited health facilities in Kisumu district.
By the end of 2006 facilities in two other pilot districts:
Kiambu, Kitui and the slum areas in Nairobi were
included. The second and third years (2007 and 2008)
focused on fine tuning the program.
Phase II was preceded by several discussions leading
to bilateral talks between the Kenya and German Gov-
ernments in February 2007 and an allocation of about
10 million Euros. To facilitate smooth transition, scale
up and institutionalization and sustainability of the pro-
ject from NCAPD to the MoH, in May 2007, the steer-
ing committee agreed that the MoH would attach some
of their staff to the project after the midterm review. Al-
though a transition program was drawn after the mid-
term review, the realization of this phase took longer
than anticipated. This was reflected by a period in 2008
where there were no activities undertaken during the
transition period (refer to patterned phase of Figure 3).
This was attributed to the long process which included a
commissioned study to review the institutional frame-
work and give recommendations on the possible transfer
of the program from the NCAPD under the Ministry of
State for Planning, National Development and Vision
2030 to the planning and finance department in the
Ministry of Health.
The study recommendations noted the undergoing
changes in the health sector and the future of the NHIF
and the envisioned national social insurance fund were
yet to be clearly defined. Thus it was recommended that
the program activities be maintained under the2011
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the technical design of phase II. The second phase was
set to start in November 2008 and run to October 2011.
Later in 2008 a discussion paper was presented in a
workshop proposing to include the OBA concept as a
government mechanism. This provided a boost to the
OBA concept within government leading to process of
identifying it as flagship program for the vision 2030[18].
During phase two, there were delays for a year in con-
tracting the technical team, finally, a consulting firm
(EPOS) was contracted to support the transition of the
program to the MoH. This culminated to the develop-
ment of a program management unit within the MoH to
support the scale up.
Program modifications
A number of changes were made by the Advisory Board
over the implementation period most of which were
based on ongoing learning. Firstly, there were transient
contextual features. For example FP commodity stock
outs, notably implants, resulted in low uptake and under
utilization of long term FP services. Based on these
experiences, the steering committee decided to use the
process monitoring funds to support the DRH to ensure
that no stock outs of implants were experienced over
the implementation period. Secondly, during phase one,
the government announced waivers for deliveries and
maternity fees in government facilities—the announce-
ment was made during an electioneering period. How-
ever, this did not affect the design directly, but
necessitated more public information in the project sites.
Thirdly, flexibility of the voucher programs meant mid-
stream changes were possible. Through the support of
German Government, a 6 million Euros food aid compo-
nent was introduced. The food aid component was
intended to meet the food requirements of the SM vou-
cher clients and malnourished clients in need of gender
based violence services. The World Food Program was
contracted by KfW to implement the food aid compo-
nent in liaison with the VSPs. The component was to
run for 3 years. The rollout of the food aid component
commenced in Nairobi and Kiambu district in July and
August 2009 followed by Kitui and Kisumu districts in
the subsequent months. In each of the sites, the proprie-
tors of the health facilities and their staff were sensitized
and trained on the food aid component before they were
given the food for distribution. However, qualitative
interviews suggest that this was misinterpreted in
Kisumu, where beneficiaries of food supplements were
associated with people living with HIV which generated
stigma affecting uptake of FP vouchers.
There were changes in voucher distribution systems as
lessons were learned. The VMA managed to regularly
monitor the claims and delinked voucher distributionfrom VSP to avoid situations where providers and distri-
butors could file claims for ghost clients. In some cases
distributors sold vouchers at higher prices. The VMA
responded by putting up posters on the prices of vou-
chers on market days. It was reported in some sites that
wealthy patients bought the vouchers potentially crowd-
ing out the ability of the intended beneficiaries to access
the voucher. In other places, some patients and VSPs
copied the vouchers and there were incidents where pro-
viders refused to see voucher clients or charged extra
amounts. The VMA conducted regular exit interviews
and careful review of claims to control irregular behav-
iour and potential fraud.
In addition to changing management practices to deter
fraud, the program added an family planning method in
the first postnatal visit on the SM package and refined
the scope of services for gender-based violence survi-
vors. In addition, changes were made to the SM voucher,
allowing an expectant mother to have several consulta-
tions -in line with standard 4 ANC visits- in the course
of pregnancy and admissions during the last trimester
(e.g. false labour). Prior to this change, providers had
used copied vouchers to make a claim.
Discussion
A systematic review on outcomes of RH voucher pro-
grams show that such strategies increase utilization of
RH services, improve quality of care and population
health outcomes. However, there is limited evidence on
program effectiveness and cost-effectiveness as well as
the analysis of implementation process of such programs
to draw out lesson for scale up [19]. This paper attempts
to fill this gap by providing systematic assessment of im-
plementation process to provide lessons on how such
programs can be implemented and scaled up.
Before illustrating lessons learnt for scale up, a number
of limitations are worth highlighting. First, the analysis
of implementation experiences is based on interviews
and retrospective documentary analysis. Although the
approach triangulated ideas from multiple sources, we
were not able to corroborate all the views in reports. Fi-
nally, some members of the research team were involved
in the inception phase of the voucher program and some
element of reflexivity may have affected the research
agenda including tools development and data analysis.
This study has identified a number of lessons from
the implementation of a RH voucher program, drawing
from three main areas: strategic management; imple-
mentation process and how design elements may have
influenced implementation process and policy implica-
tions for scale up.
In terms of strategic management, three key lessons can
be identified. First, use of an advisory board and a steering
committee helped to institutionalize accountability,
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of program elements to local settings to improve imple-
mentation. The use of strategies such as pegging subse-
quent implementation activities on the success of the
activities allowed for reflections of lessons learnt and
provided an opportunity for modifications. This
improved both implementation process and outputs. Al-
though strategic decisions made during the deliberations
of the regular committee meetings were communicated
to the VMA, future management ought to consider in-
cluding the VMA in the steering committee, perhaps as
an observer, for timely implementation of the decisions
made.
Secondly, in the early program, the NCAPD team
leader was part of the steering committee that was influ-
ential, respected and enjoyed wide support from both
government and donor community. In the second phase,
the Director of Public Health and Sanitation had a crit-
ical role in decision-making on routine operational
issues. Going forward, the program will be strengthened
by further development of systems that are insulated
from the routine turnover of key leaders. This
institutionalization is underway with the development
of a program management unit within the Ministry
of Health.
Thirdly, strategic partnership between the private and
public sector when well managed can help improve pub-
lic health goods as was demonstrated by the involvement
of PwC as the VMA. Contracting out is one feature
that has been widely documented to facilitate effective
delivery of health services but there is limited evidence
of how this works in RH voucher programs [8]. This
study shows that clear contractual arrangements need
to be put in place to facilitate implementation of
OBA programs.
The Kenyan experience has provided some insights on
the dynamics of implementation of OBA programs.
Detailed planning beforehand and use of feedback
mechanisms allow for adjustment during the program.
Good planning allows adequate time to account for un-
expected challenges and having mechanisms to counter
such situations through effective management strategies.
This also allows smooth transition from the pilot phase
to scale up. A similar assessment of the Bangladesh vou-
cher program noted that careful planning was necessary
before implementation to ensure that adequate adminis-
trative and financial resources are mobilized [5].
Implementation process will need to continue to
optimize organizational learning and flexibility as experi-
ence is gained over time. This flexibility may be difficult
in bureaucratic contexts, however, utilizing a private-
public partnership as was the case for PwC may help to
improve efficiency especially in service contracting
and claims processing. Such arrangements need toensure the objectives of the private sector and the public
sector service delivery are aligned to produce high qual-
ity performance.
In terms of design changes as the program scales,
there is a continual need to communicate the benefits
package effectively to voucher service providers, includ-
ing reminders of what information is reimbursable. This
may necessitate periodic marketing using different media
when the program goes to scale. Going forward, public
sector facility autonomy could more clearly established.
Policymakers should give the facility-level managers
greater discretion on use of these reimbursement funds
to improve quality of care for RH services or share
across the facility. Another potential challenge that
needs routine review at the planning and operational
levels is the targeting the poor. The Kenyan experience
illustrates that VMA can use local knowledge in addition
to the poverty grading tool may improve targeting. How-
ever, further work needs to be done to provide evidence
on targeting mechanisms.
The second aspect of design is the claims processing.
For an effective system, an operational management in-
formation system ought to be considered to improve the
voucher tracking system from point of service through
claims review and reimbursement and allow for flexible
addition of new information technology modules or ser-
vices in the future. This would help improve payment
speed and reduce fraud and error. The timely processing
and disbursement of vouchers and incentive payments is
likely to increase private sector participation and im-
prove population-level access to maternal services.Conclusions
For effective scale up of RH voucher programs, such
schemes will require an effective partnership between
the public and private entities guided by clearly defined
rules of engagement. The government should provide
adequate funding, play a stewardship role and look for
opportunities to utilize existing platforms to scale up
such strategies. Active, cost-effective engagement with
service providers in updating them and educating them
on the process is likely to be a role that government
should emphasize for effective participation generating
wide buy-in. This paper has illustrated that RH voucher
schemes can be implemented successfully as pilot pro-
gram and has a potential for scaling up with stronger
partnership between the public and private sectors.Endnote
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